

CROSS REFERENCE

All Congressional Record Clipping pertaining to Cambodia  
and Foreign Military Sales Act filed in separate folder under  
Legislation.

S14688

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

August 31, 1970

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, unfortunately, the Secretary of State's recommendation, which contains the justification for the President's decision, is classified "Secret" and cannot be made public.

The handling by the executive branch of the requirements of law which must be met prior to furnishing military aid is practically a rerun of the earlier decision to send arms to Cambodia, which involved a determination made retroactive a month from the President's signature in order to legalize arms shipments which had been made a month before. The Foreign Assistance Act, quite properly, contains a number of restrictions which must be satisfied before arms aid can be given to a country. These restrictions were designed both to insure the most effective use of our citizens' tax dollars and to act as a restraining influence on executive branch relations with arms aid recipients. Here are the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act that have been waived in the decision to give more arms to Cambodia:

First, Section 505(a) requires that military grant aid not be given unless the country has agreed to comply with a number of specific requirements, pertaining to use, transfer, and U.S. access to the equipment. Such an agreement was proposed to the Cambodian Government on August 20, 4 months after aid was first given, but apparently the agreement has not yet been concluded.

Second, Section 505(b)(2) requires that any defense articles totaling more than \$3,000,000 in a fiscal year cannot be furnished unless the President determines that the arms will be used to maintain its own defensive strength and "the defensive strength of the free world."

No such determination has been made nor is one likely to be made in view of Cambodia's claim of neutrality.

Third, Section 509 requires that before any defense article having a value greater than \$100,000 be given to another country that the head of the appropriate U.S. group in Cambodia certify 6 months prior to delivery that the country "has the capability to utilize effectively such article."

No such assurance has been given and we have no information on what type of equipment we plan to give her that costs more than \$100,000. A \$100,000-plus weapon would hardly fit in the "small arms" category, however.

Fourth, Section 620(t) requires that, in the case of a country that has broken diplomatic relations with the United States, diplomatic relations must be restored and a new aid agreement negotiated before military aid is provided.

We do not have an aid agreement with Cambodia.

However, section 614 of the act gives the President general authority to waive all of those and any other requirements of the act "when the President determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States." The President used this authority to waive the requirements I have listed. He is perfectly within his rights in exercising that authority. And the State Department is fully within its legal

rights in waiting 29 out of the 30 days allowed by the statute to send the determination to the Congress.

But the issue involved is not so much one of legal niceties as it is of comity between the legislative and the executive branches of Government. In recent years there has been a great erosion of the executive branch's credibility in the Congress. Instead of mutual trust and confidence there is now mutual distrust and suspicion, not only on foreign policy but across the board. I cannot believe that the President is conscious of the erosive effect on the relationship between the two branches caused by actions of this nature. In the handling of such a matter he is, I believe, a captive of a bureaucracy which, in large measure, seems to have little respect for the legislative branch. Credibility is a fragile thing and once destroyed is very difficult—and often impossible—to restore. This most recent incident is of little practical consequence but it does, I think, illustrate the operation of a way of thinking now prevalent in the bureaucracy of the executive branch. It is an attitude which seems to consider the Congress of little importance in the running of this country's affairs—foreign or domestic. There is a lesson here for every Member of Congress.

#### LACK OF ADEQUATE INSPECTION OF IMPORTED MEATS

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I never could quite understand why the people of the United States are so concerned about the strictest kind of inspection of meats of all kinds slaughtered in the United States and at the same time have very little or no concern about the lack of adequate inspection of vast amounts of imported meats.

It is wrong to believe that much of this imported meat is subjected to anything like the careful and stringent inspections made of our domestic meat products.

Mr. President, an excellent article on this subject appeared in a recent issue of the Western Livestock Reporter. It was written by Mr. Patrick K. Goggins, the publisher. It is an article that I think would be of real interest to the vast consumer public in the United States. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

##### AS I SEE IT . . .

In this world and in this age of laws and regulations and rules it certainly seems odd how the United States Department of Agriculture and others can turn a blind eye on inspection of foreign meat.

The absolute whammy that they are putting on the American packer, both at the federal and state level is unbelievable and yet, they turn their back on the uncleanness and the standards of inspection of imported meat.

This particular item has been fought out the last three weeks in Congress to a fair-  
thee-well. I don't know exactly what is going to come of it but there are more Republicans and Democrats alike joining arms in the fight to get something done. And it certainly needs to be done.

Dr. H. M. Steinmetz, Assistant Deputy Ad-

ministrator of consumer protection of the USDA is one of the biggest fighters against any passage of any kind of a meat import inspection bill. He comes up with some pretty weak arguments in my estimation of why we shouldn't touch it.

Of course the State Department, the Department of Consumer Affairs and the USDA all feel that if any kind of stringent, more strict inspection law is put into effect, the foreign countries will then counteract and put quite a lot of pressure upon American products that they buy through similar acts.

Bruce E. Hackett from Overbrook, Kansas testified in a letter to Senator Robert Dole (R. Kansas) that he and his family lived and had a trucking business in Australia from September 1963 to December of 1967 and that his brother is still there running that business.

He testifies that on in-plant handling the meat was moved from building to building in non-refrigerated cars. They did not have refrigerated vans for in-plant and that most of the meat is hauled in flat cars or flatbed type trailers with a canvas over the top of it from the plant down to the docks where it waits in the hot sun for up to 8 to 10 hours without refrigeration before it is loaded into ships.

The few inspectors we have over there who are trying to get something done, can't begin to. Here is a paragraph for instance on page 20, paragraph 53 of the Rules and Regulations of the Commonwealth of Australia: "When an officer considers that vermin are likely to come in contact with meat at an export establishment—this is on processing meat to be sent out of the country—the establishment, require the occupier to cause to be taken effective measures for the purpose of destroying the vermin."

In other words, they can use poison to get rid of the rats but nothing is done with the meat. Here in the U.S., if rats get into meat, the whole lot is condemned and goes in the tank. When it gets there to the U.S. approximately 180 pounds out of 32,000 pounds is looked at and looked at quite hastily. The U.S. inspectors then put USDA Inspected and Passed on these crates.

Now hear this: This same meat can then go into interstate shipment. It can go to federal inspected plant.

Now we have our state packers who are under state rules, who are under the same regulations as our federal packing houses. They cannot ship meat interstate. They have to ship intra-state. Our regulations won't even let this state inspected meat even get near a federal inspected packing house. Why should this imported, uncleaned meat be allowed to enter those channels without any strings attached.

They kill horses in the same plant that they kill cattle in Australia. They kill rabbits for people in the same plants as they do cattle.

And the 14 roving inspectors that we have over there don't live in Australia or New Zealand or Argentina, they live in the United States and maybe see the plant once a year. Then when they inspect, they inspect their systems, but they don't inspect livestock.

Then you look at the U.S. packer. He's forced to pay U.S. inspectors overtime anytime he works over 8 hours and when there is an inspector on the line, the whole packing house stops, because they want to look at every carcass and do.

The packing industry in the United States has paid in excess of \$15 million dollars last year alone in over-time to USDA meat inspectors to keep their plants running. This was just to the inspectors themselves, not to mention all the man-hours and loss of time waiting for these inspectors while the whole process stopped and employee pay scale went on.

Then in Australia they allow wild rabbits that are destroyed on ranches to be brought

August 31, 1970

S14687

**STATEMENT BY SENATOR MUSKIE  
ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE  
SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT**

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask for unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement made by me on Friday, August 28, 1970, before the Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, concerning appropriations for the supersonic transport.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**STATEMENT BY SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE  
BEFORE THE TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE  
OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COM-  
MITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE SST,  
AUGUST 28, 1970**

Mr. Chairman, in 1963 President Kennedy announced that the Federal Government would embark on a program to develop a supersonic transport. He pledged a \$750 million limit on Federal support of the project.

We have now spent almost \$700 million on this project and are being asked to appropriate \$290 million more. It is now likely that the prototype costs to the Government will rise to at least \$1.3 billion. Many people suspect that the Government will even be asked to finance production of these aircraft.

It is now time, Mr. Chairman, to take a second look at the SST . . . to re-evaluate it . . . and to ask whether we can afford to continue the program.

This is an appropriate time to take a second look . . .

For this year Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act. We said that major Federal programs must be carefully examined in light of their potential impact on the environment.

This year we are considering significant changes in our national transportation policies. We recognize the need to spend our money more carefully and more wisely . . . on programs that do the most good for the most people.

And this year we are faced with substantial unemployment in one-fifth of our major labor markets. We must deal with this problem effectively and quickly.

So we should ask what the SST means to us . . . with respect to our environment, our priorities and our people.

To many Americans, the SST is a symbol of man's lack of concern for his planet.

I am aware that proposed rules would prohibit SST's from flying over populated land areas. But this does not answer the questions of—

What effects sonic booms would have on ships at sea, and on fish and animal life;

What effects sideline takeoff noise four or five times that of the 747 would have on people who work in the airports or live in neighboring communities;

What effects jet vapors would have on the upper atmosphere, on world climate, and on radiation levels.

Even the Chairman of the President's Council on Environmental Quality has stated that this last question "has not received the attention it deserves." The MIT Study of Critical Environmental Problems concluded recently that "the projected SST's can have a clearly measurable effect on the world climate." The National Academy of Sciences has reached a similar conclusion.

I know that proponents of the SST have promised that these problems will be studied as soon as the prototypes are built and before the production phase.

I hope that an increasing financial commitment would not weaken that resolve. But I am concerned that this research would occupy environmental research resources that are being stretched thin as we seek to solve

the problems of air and water pollution that we have already created.

We should ask whether new research on the environmental effects of the SST—research that would be admittedly necessary before production—is the wisest use we can make of our limited capacity.

I am also concerned, Mr. Chairman, with the question of whether the FAA has complied with the National Environmental Policy Act.

Section 102 (2) (c) of the act requires a "detailed statement" from the agency on the environmental impact of any major proposal—whether or not work on the project had begun before passage of the act. The FAA has not submitted a detailed statement.

Section 102 (2) (c) of the act requires each agency to "study, develop and prescribe appropriate alternatives to recommend courses of action." The FAA has not submitted those alternatives.

The Appropriations Committee should not report the appropriations bill to the floor until the requirements of section 102 of the Environmental Policy Act have been met.

Then the Senate can make its own decision on the merits. At this time too many environmental questions have not been answered.

We should also ask whether we need the SST . . . as much as we need new mass transit systems for our cities, new airport facilities for the planes already flying, or new schools, homes and a clean environment.

These programs also cost money—as much or more than the SST. And the funds must come from the same kitty . . . resources that are limited.

This year's budget for air pollution control is \$106 million. To restore our air to a breathable, healthy level will cost the Government almost \$400 million a year. Appropriations bills for medical care, Education and Housing have been vetoed . . . yet these needs are not being met.

We cannot afford everything under the sun. We must face the realities of difficult choices . . . and say "no" to some things we should like but do not need.

Those are the questions we must ask about our priorities.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we ask what the SST means to our people.

The levels of unemployment in the State of Washington is unacceptable . . . as unacceptable as in thirty other major labor markets across the nation.

We cannot ignore the fact that the problem in Washington may get worse if the SST program is halted. But we know that the program will not reverse the rising levels across the nation . . . and this must be our first concern . . . with first call on our resources.

We must meet the challenge of unemployment nationwide. It will take new programs, more imaginative ideas and perhaps more expensive efforts. It is a problem that affects all our States . . . and that demands remedies for all our States.

The SST program is not without merit, Mr. Chairman—

It would provide job opportunities; It would be a technological victory; And it would be an exciting advance in air travel.

But at this time, Mr. Chairman, it is not the best use of our resources . . . the environmental, social and human costs are too high.

And at this time, with the kinds of needs that have gone unmet, dropping the SST is the kind of difficult decision we must make.

**MILITARY AID FOR CAMBODIA**

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on July 23 the President signed a determi-

nation, required by law, which authorizes up to \$40 million in military aid for Cambodia in fiscal year 1971. This will be in addition to the \$8.9 million already given Cambodia in fiscal year 1970.

The last sentence of the determination, which was in the form of a memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, stated:

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination and authorization promptly to the Senate and House of Representatives.

This is in accord with the requirement in the Foreign Assistance Act that the Congress be notified promptly of such decisions. Webster's defines "prompt" as "Done or rendered readily; given without delay or hesitation." The determination, transmitted by a letter from the Department of State dated August 21, was received by the Committee on Foreign Relations on August 24. Another reporting requirement, contained in the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, requires that determinations of this nature be reported to the Congress "within 30 days after each such determination." It was 29 days from the date of the President's signature to the date of the Department's transmittal letter. I note, however, that the basic information had been leaked to the press well before the committee received any official notice of the decision. I ask unanimous consent that the President's determination be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WHITE HOUSE,

July 23, 1970.

PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION No. 71-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determination and Authorization Under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, and Under the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Permitting the Furnishing of Defense Articles and Services to Cambodia up to \$40 Million

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of June 27, 1970, I hereby:

(a) Determine pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act that the authorization of the use of up to \$40 million of funds available for the grant of defense articles and services to Cambodia, without regard to the limitations of Section 505(a), 505(b)(2), second clause, 509, 620(b), or any other provision of the Act limiting the furnishing of military assistance to Cambodia, is important to the security of the United States;

(b) Authorize pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act such use of up to \$40 million for the grant of defense articles and services to Cambodia without regard to the limitations of the Sections of the Act referred to in (a) above;

(c) Determine pursuant to the third proviso of the military assistance paragraph of Title I of the Foreign Assistance Act, 1970, that military assistance to Cambodia for FY 1971 in an amount of up to \$40 million is essential to the national interest of the United States.

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination and authorization promptly to the Senate and House of Representatives.

RICHARD NIXON.

## AGNEW SEES PERIL TO U.S. IN VIETNAM IF CAMBODIA FALLS

Says on Plane En Route to  
Asia That U.S. Will Do All  
It Can to Help Lon Nol

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

Special to The New York Times

AGANA, Guam, Aug. 23—

Vice President Agnew warned today that it would be impossible for United States combat troops to pull out of South Vietnam if the Communists overthrew the Government of Premier Lon Nol and took over Cambodia.

"We're going to do everything we can to help the Lon Nol Government," the Vice President told newsmen aboard his Air Force plane as he headed toward Asia on his second diplomatic mission there this year.

A dozen hours after he conferred at the Western White House in San Clemente, Calif., with President Nixon, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's adviser for national security affairs, the Vice President underlined the importance of a non-Communist Cambodia to the Nixon Administration.

He restated the Administration's desire to withdraw United States troops from Southeast Asia, but added that "the whole subject matter of Cambodia is related to the security of our troops in Vietnam."

### Peril to Pullout Seen

Noting that Cambodia and South Vietnam shared a border 600 miles long, Mr. Agnew said that this "would make it impossible for the Vietnamization program and the disengagement of American troops to take place if Cambodia falls."

The Vice President refused to speculate about the possibility that the United States might find it necessary to send combat units to Cambodia again as it did last spring in a two-month assault with South Vietnamese on Communist border sanctuaries.

He stressed the Administration view that it was concerned chiefly with the threat to the safety of withdrawing American forces by a Communist take-over of Cambodia.

But Mr. Agnew appeared to have carried that theme a step beyond previous White House assertions, linking the

security of the Cambodian Government with the security of the Americans.

He said that members of the United States Senate who have expressed fears that the Nixon Administration was becoming increasingly committed to the preservation of the Government of Premier Lon Nol failed to realize that "we have no commitment to Cambodia, but we do have a commitment to South Vietnam and we have a tremendous moral obligation to our own forces fighting in South Vietnam not to leave them in such a vulnerable and weakened position that they would be unable to extricate themselves."

On his nine-day journey, the Vice President will discuss Cambodia and other issues with leaders in South Korea, Thailand, South Vietnam and Taiwan. His mission consists largely of reassuring the allies that antiwar sentiment in the United States, particularly in the Senate, will not diminish the Administration's ability to replace United States combat troops with other forms of aid.

The allies no doubt will ask him, said the Vice President, about an amendment adopted in the Senate last week to prohibit United States financing of here, Mr. Agnew said Asian

South Vietnamese, Thai or other allied troops who come to the aid of Cambodia or neighboring Laos.

Mr. Agnew expressed confidence that the House would not go along with the amendment to the pending military procurement appropriations bill.

But even should the amendment become law, he said, "There are many ways to bring about financial assistance to a friendly nation." He implied that rather than subsidize the allied troops directly, the United States could perform a book-keeping shift that would give some other form of "financial relief" and enable the ally to pay for dispatch of the troops out of its own treasury.

The Vice President toned down considerably his criticism of Senate doves at home. Only last Monday he charged that supporters of the plan offered by Senators Mark O. Hatfield, Republican of Oregon, and George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, for a fixed deadline to withdraw all American troops from South Vietnam were backing a "blueprint for the first defeat in the history of the United States."

Today, as he sat on the arm of a chair and took questions from reporters as Air Force One flew 35,000 feet above the Pacific for an overnight stop here, Mr. Agnew said Asian

leaders might well be concerned about Senate attitudes. But he said there were encouraging signs—among them the defeat of three attempts to block expansion of the Administration's Safeguard antiballistic missile program—that showed a "weakening of this isolationist sentiment."

### Will Be Frank With Allies

However, the Vice President also stated that he planned to be "very candid" with the Asian leaders and tell them that the United States was reordering its priorities—cutting back on defense spending and increasing domestic budgets. He was unequivocal, for instance, in stating that the decision "will be carried out" to withdraw 20,000 of the American troops stationed in South Korea. The authorized strength for American troops in South Korea is 64,000.

The issue of United States troop reduction is particularly troublesome to the Government of President Chung Hee Park of South Korea, whom Mr. Agnew will meet tomorrow on the first stop of his four-nation tour.

"Steps are being taken to provide increased material assistance" to South Korea in return for the troop pullout, said the Vice President, but he declined to be specific about the aid.

### U.S. Denies Policy Shift

SAN CLEMENTE, Calif., Aug. 23 (UPI)—The White House said today that Vice President Agnew's remarks linking United States interests in Asia to the stability of the Cambodian Government represented no change in the Nixon Administration's policy.

THE WASHINGTON POST

DATE 7/24/67 PAGE 1

# Seen Vital To Pullout In Vietnam

GUAM, Aug. 23 (AP) — Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, heading for Asia, said today that "we're going to do everything we can to help the Lon Nol government" in Cambodia because "the whole matter of Cambodia is related to the security of our troops in Vietnam."

At another point, however, Agnew insisted, "we have no commitment to Cambodia" but view events in that Southeast Asian nation only in terms of how they affect conditions in neighboring South Vietnam.

His statement about helping Lon Nol was the strongest by any U.S. official so far for the embattled Cambodian regime.

[In San Clemente, however, a White House spokesman said that Agnew's statement represented no change in U.S. policy of supporting an independent and neutral Cambodia.]

"There is no way that any judgment that I make about Cambodia could be made without it being attached in substantial measure to the security of our troops in South Vietnam," Agnew said.

Asked if the only way American troops would be sent back to Cambodia would be to protect U.S. forces in Vietnam, he replied: "That is exactly right."

"There is a 600-mile border that would make it impossible for the Vietnamization program and the disengagement of American troops if Cambodia falls," the Vice President told reporters aboard Air Force Two as he flew across the international date line to this mid-Pacific isle after a refueling stop in Hawaii.

Military leaders and Gov. Carlos Camacho welcomed Agnew at Anderson Air Force Base here as he arrived for an overnight stop before flying

on Monday to Seoul, South Korea, the first of four scheduled Asian stops.

Agnew and his party arrived in Seoul at about 1 a.m., Washington time. He made no statement at the airport.

His talks with President Chung Hee Park will revolve around U.S. plans to help with the modernization of Korean military forces in view of the scheduled withdrawal by June 1971 of 20,000 of the 63,000 American troops there.

Asked about specific U.S. aid plans for Korea, Agnew saw "little likelihood that as a result of my conversation any specific action will be proposed to the Congress."

Agnew charged that Friday's Senate action barring U.S. financial support for Thai or South Vietnamese efforts on behalf of the governments of Laos and Cambodia is "a debilitating factor that could indirectly hurt the security of U.S. forces in Vietnam."

"I doubt very strongly whether the House will go along with it," he said.

The Vice President indicated the Nixon administration might find some other way to underwrite the proposed dispatch of 5,000 Thai troops to help the hard-pressed Lon Nol government, which has been fighting off Communist attacks on the capital of Phnom Penh.

"I don't think," he said, "that necessarily troop financing is critical if alternative means of financial relief can be found for the country which would allow it to finance its own troops."

"To carry out the Nixon doctrine," Agnew replied to a follow-up question, "the President is going to find whatever means he has to make certain that the concept of the doctrine is met."

Under the doctrine first enunciated by President Nixon here 13 months ago, the United States plans to reduce its Far East forces while reaffirming its treaty commitments and helping those allies willing to help themselves.

**Unrelated to Campaign**

Agnew said: "I really don't expect that this trip will have any relation to my campaign for congressional elections."

out agreed with a questioner that the trip would permit him to speak more knowledgeably about foreign affairs.

Agnew said there was "no plan for me to go into Cambodia" during the trip. On his previous trip he said there were no plans to go to Vietnam, where he eventually went for 24 hours. This time, it is on his schedule although no date has yet been announced.

Both President Nixon and Adm. John S. McCain Jr., the top U.S. commander in the Pacific with whom he met in Hawaii, are very much encouraged by the course of events in Vietnam, the Vice President said, especially the Vietnamization program and the strengthened status of the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

In stating U.S. determination to prevent the Cambodian government of Lon Nol from falling, Agnew said, "we cannot predict in advance, based on the multiple contingencies that one could imagine, exactly what we would do in any given situation."

"That kind of diplomacy is very dangerous, and I wouldn't undertake it," he went on.

## Refuses to Speculate

Asked if the support the United States might provide included sending in U.S. troops if Lon Nol asks for them, Agnew replied: "No, I think I made it perfectly clear that I wouldn't attempt to anticipate the contingent situations that may arise."

The Vice President was then asked if this meant he was not ruling out possible use of U.S. troops if the situation deteriorated. Agnew said it depended upon what was meant by deteriorated.

"If you meant that if the Communist Chinese suddenly attacked Cambodia in force would I commit that we wouldn't do anything about it?" he asked. "I couldn't make that commitment obviously."

But he noted that the President "has no intention of recommitting" U.S. troops into Cambodia and said any South Vietnamese decision about action in that country "has to be left to their diagnosis of what's vital for their own security."

"We will not encourage it or discourage it, only insofar as it affects the security of American troops," Agnew said.



*Cambodia*

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THE EVENING STAR

DATE 22 AUG 70

PAGE 12

# Senate Votes Curb on Funds To Allies of Cambodia, Laos

By DANA BULLEN  
Star Staff Writer

The Senate has called for a ban on use of U.S. funds for military operations by Vietnamese and other forces in support of the government of Cambodia and Laos.

By a voice vote, the Senate yesterday approved a proposal by Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., intended to head off broader military operations that could involve the United States in a war to support the government of either country.

"If they want to do it on their own, we cannot stop them. But we don't have to pay the bills," Fulbright said.

## Stennis Backs Curb

Sen. John C. Stennis, D-Miss., chairman of the Armed Services Committee, agreed that U.S. funds should not be used to back military operations by other Southeast Asian nations in support of the Cambodian or Laotian governments.

The provision, approved by the Senate as an amendment to the \$19.2 billion military procurement authorization bill, however, was phrased to allow U.S.-supported operations in border sanctuary areas of Cambodia and to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.

In other action, Fulbright asserted a \$50 million arms aid agreement with Cambodia appears to be "a very substantial step" toward creation of a U.S. commitment to that nation.

Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said, however, the Nixon admin-

istration spokesmen who appeared before the unit asserted that the arms aid agreement did not constitute a commitment to Cambodia.

Supporting Fulbright's assessment, Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, said after a closed-door briefing before the Senate committee that American involvement in Cambodia is "clearly . . . growing." Church said it raised questions about whether this country is assuming responsibility to defend the Lon Nol government.

At the committee briefing, it was understood that administration spokesmen indicated every effort would be made to avoid direct U.S. involvement such as in Vietnam.

In floor debate preceding approval of the amendment to bar funds for operations by other Southeast Asian nations in support of Cambodia and Laos, Fulbright said it would be "intolerable" for this country to finance such activity.

## Bipartisanship Noted

Sen. Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ariz., said: "We are not saying to South Vietnam, 'You cannot attack Laos.' We are saying, 'You cannot expect any help from us if you do it.'"

Stennis joined in supporting the Fulbright amendment, stating it conformed to the intentions of the armed services committee.

The Senate's action made it plain that both critics and backers of the Nixon administration's policies on the war do not support use of U.S. funds to broaden the conflict by financing mili-

tary operations by other nations in support of either Cambodia or Laos.

In another development, Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., said in a Senate speech that activities of senators supporting a proposal to cut off funds for the war have not violated any law or "jeopardized" ethics and propriety.

Responding to a proposal by Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan., McGovern said "every penny" received or spent in connection with the amendment "to end the war" has been publicly disclosed.

## Percy Proposal Approved

McGovern said sponsors of the amendment were asking the Internal Revenue Service for a ruling on any tax responsibilities. But, he said, he did not intend to be "diverted" from the question of whether Congress should set a limit on the Vietnam war.

Senators also approved, by voice vote, a proposal by Sen. Charles H. Percy, R-Ill., to reduce permanent change of station assignments for military personnel as an economy move and a proposal by Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind., to require Congress to set military manpower levels on an annual basis.

Sen. Fred R. Harris, D-Okla., urged approval of an amendment to the military procurement authorization bill to set a maximum level for military personnel that only Congress could increase.

Harris asserted that this should be part of any move toward creation of a volunteer army.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP			8/24/70
TO: Mrs. Maury			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS: The attached contain Agnew's statement that upset Bill Woodruff. He feels that if this is raised on the floor when the JCP Appropriation			
FROM: JHB (au)			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	

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*Bill is being debated,  
I will cause real  
trouble.*

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